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Abstract 
The present study sets to investigate the previous Eastern enlargement of the 
European Union from two angles. The initial decision to expand the EU is viewed 
as a result of rhetorical action. Candidates and their supporters used arguments 
based on collective identity, norms and values of the Western community to 
shame opponents into acquiescing to enlargement. However, rhetorical action 
theory can not explain why the new member states in the Union are still not able 
to enjoy the full benefits of their memberships, and why their decision-making 
powers are still constrained by decisions taken by the Member States composing 
the Union before the enlargement, the so called EU15.  
The analysis suggests that the reasons why the Union currently 
suffers from inequality among its members and from an unreasonably ineffective 
decision-making apparatus are due to egoism and short-sighted political self-
interests of the EU15. Using rational choice theory when analysing three different 
empirical cases, the analysis illustrates how the Member States grasped the 
opportunities offered to them in the Nice negotiations, the negotiations on the 
European Constitution and recently in the negotiations on the Commission’s 
proposed Services Directive to safe guard their self-interests in a Union 
containing 25 Member States.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research purpose, questions and plan 
Eastern enlargement has arguably been the most consequential political project for 
the EU in the last decade, and it is one of the most important and difficult chal-
lenges facing Europe in the post-cold war period. The way the EU handles the 
enlargement issue will have profound consequences not only for the newcomers 
in the Union, but also for the EU itself, as well as its neighbouring ‘non-applicant’ 
states. The risks involved in the enlargement process are well known to the EU. 
Not only does enlargement threaten to disturb the internal order of the EU, the 
new external borders that will follow from the expansion could also create new 
divisions on the European continent and thus foster instability in Europe at large. 
Furthermore, enlargement require internal institutional reforms such as the re-
structuring of major policies (such as common agriculture and structural funds) 
and decision-making procedures in a Community consisting of 25 to 27 mem-
bers.1  
Given these risks, why did the European Union not simply choose to 
remain as it is? And why did not individual Member States, in particular those 
that expect to pay the highest price for enlargement, use their power to veto this 
process? Assuming, as most of the literature on international relations does, that 
actors seek to maximize their own interest, this is what we would expect of the 
EU.2  
 The current Eastern enlargement is often said to be the most impor-
tant political event since the collapse of the Soviet Union. What mainly aroused 
my curiosity when following this development over the past few years was that 
Eastern enlargement is a puzzle for the rationalist theories that dominated the 
study of international institutions and regional integration in IR. While rationalist 
theory explains the willingness of East European states to join the EU, it does not 
explain why Member States decided to admit them. Moreover, the process of how 
Eastern enlargement came about did not seem to correspond to standard socio-
logical accounts of habitualized or internalized rule-driven behaviour, thus the 
“liberal community hypothesis” derived from sociological institutionalist as-
sumptions could not fill the gap either.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
1 Corsetti et.al, 2004 
2 See Schimmelfennig, 2001 & 2003; Sedelmeier, 2000; Fierke and Wiener, 1999; Friis, 1998 
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The best suited theory in my mind to explain the Eastern enlarge-
ment of the EU is Frank Schimmelfennig’s theory about rhetorical action. 
Schimmelfennig’s approach shows that political processes can be seen to contain 
something ‘more’ than considerations of utility and processes of strategic bar-
gaining. Consequently, references to utility, which are at the centre of processes 
of bargaining, are seen as only one way in which the decision to enlarge might be 
justified and thus as one reason why the EU decided to enlarge. 
Rhetorical action theory can explain the initial decision to enlarge 
the Union. The theory of rhetorical entrapment shows us how the Member States 
gave in to the international pressure from the applicant countries and proponents 
for enlargement within the Union, and started negotiating on Eastern enlargement 
although the rational choice for some of them would have been to veto enlarge-
ment. The reason why they still gave in to enlargement is according to 
Schimmelfennig’s theory that the Member States were rhetorical entrapped. How-
ever, although I found Schimmelfennig’s rhetorical action theory best suited 
among existing theories to explain EU enlargement, there is something missing in 
his reasoning. Schimmelfennig’s theory can not explain the element of self-inter-
est and egoism of the EU15 that still constrain the newcomers in the Union today. 
If the MS were/are rhetorically entrapped, why do they still not truly embrace the 
newcomers as equal members of the union?  
I will in this study argue that the domestic pressure in the EU15 has 
played a far more important role than given in Schimmelfennig’s theory. I will 
claim that the EU15’s self-interests still constrain the newcomers and the profits 
from their memberships. Moreover, I will argue that this egoism of the EU15 
works against the effectiveness of the EU’s institutions which is crucial in a Un-
ion consisting of 27 Member States and, as a consequence, the Union is worse off 
both regarding equality among members and ability to work effectively. The aim 
of this study is to explain why the new Member States in the Union are still not 
able to enjoy the full benefits of their memberships, and why their decision-mak-
ing powers are still constrained by decisions taken by the EU15. Using rational 
choice institutionalism when analysing three different empirical cases, I will show 
how the Member States needed guarantees that their self-interests would be safe 
guarded after the enlargement, and how they grasped the opportunities offered to 
them in the Nice negotiations, the negotiations on the European Constitution and 
recently in the negotiations on the Commission’s proposed Services Directive.  
Thus, drawing on the works of Schimmelfennig, I have used prob-
lem-driven research with a rationalist approach to show what is missing in his 
reasoning and to fill in the gaps. Hence, the analysis here fits with what existing 
research on enlargement has concluded, but takes the analysis a step further. 
Schimmelfennig’s theory explains why the Union decided upon enlargement at 
all, something that rational choice theory can not do. However, to explain why the 
new Member States’s memberships are still constrained by the self-interests of the 
EU15, a rational choice approach is needed.  
After a short introduction, chapter 2 provides an overview of the two 
approaches adapted in this analysis on the Eastern enlargement. The two main 
frameworks that are presented in brief are rhetorical action theory and rational 
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choice theory. Chapter 3 presents an explanation to the Eastern enlargement as 
offered by the rhetorical action theory. Chapter 4 offers a comparative analysis of 
the three different empirical cases in this study, the Nice Treaty, the Constitution 
and the Services Directive, using rational choice as an analysing tool. Finally, a 
conclusion will summarise the findings of the study.  
1.2 Methodology and sources 
This analysis of Eastern enlargement is theoretically embedded in the current de-
bate in International Relations between “rationalism” and “constructivism”. I do 
not suggest, however, that it makes sense to test “rationalism” against “construc-
tivism” in the study of enlargement. They do not provide us with elaborated and 
internally consistent competing hypotheses on enlargement that we could rigor-
ously test against each other. I therefore use rationalism and Schimmelfennig’s 
work drawing on constructivism as partially complementary sources of hypothesis 
construction for the study of enlargement. They complement each other in the 
sense that rhetorical action theory is best suited to explain the decision to enlarge 
the EU, something that rational choice theory is not able to do, but rational choice 
theory can best explain what has happened after the enlargement.  
The thesis is methodologically based on theoretical-qualitative 
analysis, yet some empirical data is presented requiring no further statistical 
treatment. As a project, it is mainly an explanatory study of the EU Eastern 
enlargement, involving a certain degree of reference to the discourse of this phe-
nomenon, without however being itself a work of discourse analysis. No textual 
structures and patterns are traced; the focus is on the actual arguments and the 
underlying common assumptions and perceptions. The cases of the Nice Treaty, 
the Constitution and the Services Directive are studied under the broad ontologi-
cal framework of rational choice theory.  
Epistemologically, the essay is positioned within the paradigm of 
critical social science, distancing itself from both the absolute objectivism of 
positivism and the inherent subjectivism of interpretive, post-positivist social sci-
ence. The definition of social science closer to the perception of the present analy-
sis is that of “a critical process of inquiry that goes beyond surface illusions to 
uncover the real structures in the material world in order to help people change 
conditions and build a better world for themselves”3. For critical social science, 
objectivity does not imply the absence of values. Instead, it argues that there can 
exist no value-free social science, since values always intermingle with facts and 
discourse. Rather, objectivity is the absence of distortions that allows for the sci-
entific reproduction of a true picture of reality. In that respect, the essay attempts 
to be objective, without being value-free.  
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The aim of this study is not to elaborate the future of the European 
Union and the different institutional and economic obstacles and problems that 
may arouse after the enlargement. In the same manner, the essay does not touch 
upon the theoretical problems that arise from the notion of an EU enlargement as 
such. Rather, it seeks to outline the structural objectives of those social forces, 
whose interests and values are currently dominating the formation of the EU’s 
consensus. In this context, the three examples of EU decision-making practice 
referred to in Chapter 3 should be regarded not as fully-fledged case studies but 
rather as illustrations of the main argument, which is not only based upon dis-
course but also upon concrete decisions and interests. These illustrations serve a 
theory-confirming purpose; in no way do they represent a hypothesis-generating 
exercise, although they add to the elaboration of the main argument of the essay.  
A number of primary and secondary sources form the bulk of em-
pirical material of the thesis. The three principal texts under consideration are: a) 
Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union (European Council, 
2001), b) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Council, 2004) 
and c) Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on 
services in the internal market (European Commission, 2004). The works of 
Schimmelfennig and Moravcsik provides for most of the theoretical framework of 
rhetorical action and rational choice respectively. Internet resources have also 
been utilised, including the European Union’s homepage.  
1.3 Eastern enlargement – a rational choice for the 
EU? 
One would expect the EU to support enlargement as a whole or enlargement to 
specific states on the basis of expectations of utility, and not to do so if such ar-
guments were hard to find. Utility could be in the form of economic or security 
gains. There seems to be a general agreement that the increased trade with the 
applicant states that will result from enlargement will be beneficial to the EU 
economy. Furthermore, access to primary resources and labour at a low cost in the 
applicant states might further strengthen the competitiveness of the EU.4 How-
ever, most studies of enlargement have come to the conclusion that the economic 
cost of enlargement will outweigh the gains in the short and the medium term for 
the Member States. The most important argument against a ‘utility’ hypothesis is 
perhaps that it would suffice to enlarge the internal market to the applicant states 
in order to guarantee the economic benefits that might emerge in a long-term per-
spective.5 At the same time this would protect the EU from the costs of including 
applicants in their agricultural and regional policies.  
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However, even though enlargement will be costly to the EU as a 
whole, it might be beneficial to certain Member States. Overall it is clear that 
those Member States that will gain the most from enlargement are those that are 
net contributors to the EU’s budget, whereas those countries that are net benefici-
aries have little to gain from enlarging the Union.6 Those who already have 
important trade interests in the applicant states must also be considered to be 
amongst the beneficiaries in an enlargement process.7  
Utility does not have to take the form of economic gain. Increased 
security could be considered a gain to the EU as well. However, enlarging does 
not necessarily mean that the problem of security in central Europe (to the extent 
that there is one) is solved. It could equally well lead to a security vacuum further 
east. Consequently, the pressure on the EU to have an efficient security policy 
would increase. From this perspective, enlargement seems counterproductive. 
This is even more so because the capacity of the common foreign and security 
policy to deal with the security agenda might be further reduced as a result of 
enlargement. Developing a cohesive foreign policy will be far more difficult with 
20 or 25 members than 15. Due to their geographic location and different histori-
cal experiences, the new Member States in central, eastern and southern Europe 
will bring new foreign policy perspectives and interests into the EU. Together 
with different foreign policy interests also come new neighbours and different 
relations with third states. Rather than strengthen the institutions of foreign policy, 
enlargement threatens to make agreement even more difficult.  
The difficulties and complications that enlargement is expected to 
entail seem evident also in the security area. If expectation of efficiency had been 
the most important element in the argument for enlargement, or the only form of 
argument, one would have expected that the EU would ensure that its own deci-
sion-making apparatus would be able to make use of this added value in security. 
What the EU did instead was to commit itself to enlargement before the decision-
making apparatus was reformed.8 
                                                                                                                                     
 
6 Torreblanca, 1997 
7 Baldwin et al., 1997 
8 European Council, 2000a 
 6 
2 The theoretical approach 
2.1 Rhetorical action theory 
While rationalist theory explains the willingness of East European states to join 
the EU, it does not convincingly explain why Member States decided to admit 
them. To elaborate this question further I will use Frank Schimmelfennig’s devel-
opment of a theoretical approach of ‘rhetorical action’ to explain the initial deci-
sion to enlarge the Union. Schimmelfennig argues that the expansion to the East 
can be understood in terms of liberal democratic community-building, and that the 
decision to expand was the result of rhetorical action. Candidate countries and 
their supporters used arguments based on collective identity, norms and values of 
the Western community to shame opponents to give in to enlargement.  
Schimmelfennig uses two main arguments. First, the constitutive 
liberal rules of the Western international community – rather than the constella-
tions of material, security or economic, interests and power – are the most impor-
tant explanatory factors in the expansion of the EU. Second, it is through rhetori-
cal action – rather than logic of appropriateness – that these community rules have 
had an impact on enlargement.9   
It is the first basic argument that the eastern enlargement can best be 
explained if the EU is seen as a community representative and community-build-
ing agency. The international community that the EU represents is the European 
community of states, and its collective identity is defined mainly by liberal values 
and norms. The belief in and adherence to liberal human rights are the fundamen-
tal ideas and practices that constitute the community. This liberal identity, based 
on values and norms of the Western international community, is formally institu-
tionalized in the EU as constitutive organizational rules.10  
The policies of the EU toward non-members are governed by these 
liberal community rules. The EU seeks to socialize outside states into the liberal 
order and thereby expand the European liberal international community. If 
European non-members are successfully socialized, that is, they adopt the 
collective identity of the liberal international community, share its values, and 
follow its norms; they are entitled to join the EU as full flexed members. Based on 
this hypothesis, outlined by Schimmelfennig, we can explain Eastern enlargement 
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as the admission of former communist countries that have successfully 
democratized and adopted the constitutive rules of the EU. Those CEECs that had 
preceded the most on the path of democratic consolidation were invited by the EU 
to become members.11  
It is the second basic argument of Schimmelfennig’s approach that 
the process by which eastern enlargement came about was characterized by rhe-
torical action. Rhetorical action is the strategic use and exchange of arguments to 
persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences. In the enlargement 
process, neither Member States nor candidate states acted appropriately, that is, on 
the basis of rule-based enlargement routines or internalized membership norms. 
They did not take the membership rules of the EU as moral commands. In other 
words, the enlargement is not fully to be explained in terms of liberal values and 
norms. Rather, enlargement preferences reflected material environmental condi-
tions and egoistic interests of the negotiators. Additionally, whereas individual 
Member States, above all Germany, supported enlargement as an instrument to 
control the effects of negative interdependence and to increase their gains from 
positive interdependence with their neighbouring region, neither they nor the 
CEECs possessed the bargaining power to impose enlargement on the reluctant 
majority of Member States.12 
In order to overcome this reluctance, the CEE governments and their 
supporters in the EU turned to rhetorical action. They based their arguments for 
enlargement on the collective identity and the constitutive liberal values and 
norms to which the members of the EU had consented. They exposed the incon-
sistency between the EU’s unwillingness to enlarge, on the one hand, and the 
membership rules, past rhetorical commitments to a pan-European democratic 
community and past treatment of outsider states, on the other. The goal of this 
campaign was to shame the hesitant Member States into complying with the com-
munity rules and honouring past commitments. As a result, the opponents of East-
ern enlargement among the EU15 found themselves rhetorically entrapped. It was 
clear that they, if they openly opposed or threatened to veto enlargement, would 
face publicly reneging on prior commitments and damaging their credibility as 
community members in good standing.13 
If inconsistency and partiality are publicly exposed and the rhetori-
cal actor is caught using the community rules arbitrarily and cynically, his credi-
bility diminishes. As a result, his future rhetorical actions will be less effective 
and his ability to manipulate the standard of legitimacy and further his interests 
will be reduced. The “shadow of the future” in a community environment is 
indefinitely long in principle, and so is the “shadow of the past”: community 
members that were caught arguing faithlessly and egoistically have a difficult 
time re-establishing trust in and respect for their arguments so that they will be 
taken seriously by their audience. Thus, rhetorical actors are likely to be forced to 
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stick to prior argumentative commitments and to act according to claims that run 
counter to their current self-interest.  
Schimmelfennig stresses that his approach draws from standard so-
ciological institutionalist work but deviates from it in that it rejects the claim that 
collective identities and rules constitute the issue-specific interests of state actors 
and that state actors follow a norm-guided “logic of appropriateness”. On the 
contrary, Schimmelfennig argues that egoistic interests and instrumental action 
still dominates the enlargement preferences and politics.14 
In sum, the concept of rhetorical action provides a mechanism for 
causally linking egoistic individual preferences and rule-based collective out-
comes. In an institutional community environment, rational actors must justify 
their goals, preferences and behaviour on the basis of the community’s standard of 
legitimacy. Community members whose egoistic preferences are in line with the 
basic community rules can add legitimacy to their preferences and mobilize social 
pressure on their opponents. They do this through rhetorical action, which is the 
strategic use of arguments based on the community’s standard of legitimacy.  
2.2 Rational choice institutionalism 
2.2.1 Rationalist premises 
Although the actual enlargement could largely be understood in terms of liberal 
values and norms and of rhetorical action, there are still some essential patterns of 
egoistic interests in the final outcome of the enlargement negotiations. To elabo-
rate these patterns further I will use a theoretical approach of rationalist institu-
tionalism. 
 Rationalist approaches to the study of European enlargement share 
the premises of individualism, state-centrism, materialism, egoism and instru-
mentalism.  
Individualism: Rationalist theories treat the individual actor (and not 
social structures) as the crucial source of social patterns. The actors’ identities, 
interests, and preferences are taken as given and as fairly stable over time.  
State-centrism: International Relations rationalist theories regard the 
state, a corporate actor, and not the individual, as the central actor in international 
politics. In a rationalist framework, however, this is not problematic as long as the 
corporate actor (the state) has a unitary will, a unitary behaviour, and a certain 
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degree of autonomy. Since the state is assumed to be a unitary actor by IR ration-
alist theories, these conditions are all covered.15 
Materialism: Rationalist institutionalism regards the international 
environment as anarchical and technical, free from hierarchical authority struc-
tures and characterized by the predominance of material structures like the distri-
bution of power and wealth. These material conditions are the most decisive ex-
planatory factors for the process and outcomes in international relations. This does 
not, however, exclude that social norms or rules too effectively constrain states, 
but such intersubjective structures (or institutions) are not constitutive for the in-
ternational environment of the state actors. Ideas and institutions provide con-
straints and incentive, not reasons, for action; they alter cost-benefit calculations, 
not identities and interests. Thus, the establishment of normative institutions is 
explained as a result of material interest and rational action, and the effectiveness 
and stability of the normative institutions depend on their utility for the actors.  
Egoism: Rationalist institutionalism in IR assumes that actors act 
egoistically. The preferences of actors are, according to this theory, based on their 
estimation of their own welfare, not that of others.  
Instrumentalism: Finally, Rationalist institutionalism assumes that, 
in pursuing their self-interest, the actors behave instrumentally. In order to maxi-
mize their own welfare, they choose the behavioural option best suited for this 
purpose under the given circumstances. However, objective rationality is usually 
not regarded as a realistic assumption since no actor could possibly possess full 
information about the possible courses of action and their consequences or the 
capacity to process this information. Furthermore, actors do not have to be strict 
utility maximizers, why most authors settle for some form of “bounded” or “sub-
ject rationality” instead.16 
These five premises provide the theoretical foundation for the ra-
tionalist analysis of international organizations and their enlargement. Rationalists 
regard international organizations, such as the EU, as instrumental associations 
designed to help states pursue their own goals more efficiently. International or-
ganizations are attractive to states because they reduce transactions costs through 
centralization and independence. They make collective action more efficient by 
providing stable negotiating forum for pooling activities, elaborating norms and 
acting as a neutral information provider and arbiter. States delegate authority to 
international organizations in order to “constrain and control one another”17. Inter-
national organizations remove the interpretation, implementation and enforcement 
of agreements from the reach of domestic oppositions and from the unilateral 
control of state governments, and thereby they raise the visibility and the costs of 
non-compliance.18 
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However, rationalist IR theories do not regard international organi-
zations as autonomous actors in international politics. The state actors’ concern 
for autonomy is too strong to allow international organizations to represent any-
thing but the instruments of states. The power of international bureaucracy is 
relatively limited, and international organizations are regarded as clubs, that is, 
voluntary groups where members would not join or stay in the club unless a net 
gain resulted from membership. Rationalist IR theories assume that in an anarchi-
cal environment such as the international system, any cooperative institution must 
be self-enforcing on the basis of individual state interests.19 This club-theoretical 
assumption is further by the decision-making procedures of international organi-
zations which generally require a consensus on the admission of new members.  
2.2.2 Club Theory 
A club is defined as a voluntary group deriving mutual benefit from sharing an 
impure public good (which means that the gods are excludable as well as partially 
divisible and rival). This definition is held to fit most international organizations, 
and in the EU, tariff barriers and other legal boundaries are used to exclude states 
from the benefits of free trade and other economic freedoms.20 Moreover, EU 
market regulations as well as distributive and redistributive policies (such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the regional and structural policies) create di-
visible and rival benefits. Thus, enlargement not only expands the internal market 
but also creates crowding costs and partial rivalry among the members because 
new members demand their share of the subsidies, and the utility that a member 
receives from its consumption depends upon the number of other members with 
whom he must share its benefits.21 Therefore, the size of membership is a major 
issue for the organization, and restrictions of membership size must be placed on 
clubs like the EU.  
The cost and benefit balance determines whether the club will 
enlarge its membership or not. For an international organization to expand, each 
Member State must expect positive net benefits form enlargement in order to let 
new members in and enlarge the club, and each state applying for membership 
must expect positive net benefits from joining the organization.22  
Transaction costs in a club organization consist of the decision-
making and management costs that come with the establishment and the work of 
such organizations. These costs naturally rise with the enlargement of an organi-
zation. First, the administrative workload of the organization increases, thus more 
personnel is needed which means higher personnel costs. These factors raise the 
budgetary costs of the organization. Second, communication and information ex-
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change become more costly with more members. Efficient, direct face-to-face 
communication is increasingly replaced by more unwieldy, formalized proce-
dures, and these formalized procedures become more time consuming with each 
new member that makes use of its right to speak or to table official documents.23  
Furthermore, all documents and speeches must be translated from 
and into the languages of the additional members. This is very much the case in 
the EU where administrative costs rise disproportionately when additional official 
languages have to be interpreted and translated from and into all other official 
languages. Thus, the costs of communication and information in the EU can be 
assumed to increase disproportionately with the expansion of membership.24 
In a homogenous club, all club members have identical preferences. 
In reality, however, heterogeneous or mixed club are the rule. This is also the case 
in the EU. Any enlargement increases the heterogeneity of the membership be-
cause new national attitudes, traditions, institutions, and special interests affect the 
policy-making of the Union.25 This is particularly true for Eastern enlargement as 
the CEECs bring with them the peculiar historical, political, economic, and social 
heritage and problems of their region. They all have a low level of socioeconomic 
development, compared to the western European countries, and little experience 
with the capitalist market economy; they struggle with the problems of both eco-
nomic and political transformation from a communist society; and they possess 
political traditions of authoritarianism and foreign domination. These characteris-
tics all distinguish them from the core of the old members and most of the new-
comers of previous enlargement rounds.26 
Heterogeneity increases decision-making costs because, according to 
decision theory, the costs of centralized decisions are likely to rise where more 
actors of differing preferences participate. Under the unanimity rule which still 
applies to many important EU policies and all treaty revisions, enlargement will 
reduce the Member States’ capacity to reach decisions as increased heterogeneity 
will reduce the likelihood of consensus. Even qualified majorities are more diffi-
cult to build in an enlarged organization because the number of potential blocking 
coalitions rises disproportionally.27 In addition, majority voting reduces the degree 
of control for each Member State in an expanded EU, in particular that of the lar-
ger Member States.28  
In sum, a more realistic analysis of enlargement will not only have 
to take into account the characteristics of the goods provided by the organization 
and the balance between the crowding effects and the resource contributions of an 
expanded membership. It will also have to take into account increasing transaction 
or management costs, the heterogeneity of preferences, their effects on the bar-
gaining processes and outcomes among members.  
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3 The decision to enlarge the EU 
Schimmelfennig argues that the EU has committed itself ideologically and insti-
tutionally to the integration of all European liberal societies since its establish-
ment and the Union has continually confirmed this commitment in its rhetoric. 
This rhetorical commitment has created the condition for effective shaming during 
the enlargement process. Actors with self-interest in enlargement have strategi-
cally used normative arguments to shame the rest of the EU into accepting it. 
These arguments effectively silenced any open opposition to Eastern enlargement, 
allowed the “drivers” among the Member States as well as the associated CEE 
states to make incremental progress with the preparation of Eastern enlargement, 
and ensured that enlargement policy has remained on track in spite of difficult 
practical problems and major distributional conflicts. When rhetorical commit-
ment was put to the test by rhetorical arguments, it led to rhetorical entrapment.  
 The constant issues of ‘what is Europe’ and ‘who can the EU legiti-
mately claim to represent’ certainly arise with enlargement. It entails decisions of 
who the Europeans are and what kinds of values characterize Europe. In order to 
resolve issues such as who should be part of the EU and where should the borders 
of the EU be, the EU could choose a solution that seems appropriate given a par-
ticular identity or role, or a solution that appears ‘right’, or fair according to stan-
dards that are not dependent on a particular cultural identity. The EU claims that 
the rules that govern the enlargement process are not just ‘specially preferred’, but 
rely on universally valid principles.29  
3.1 Rhetorical commitment 
When looking more closely at the EU’s statements about relations with Eastern 
Europe, what emerges as a main pattern is the description of east and west in 
Europe as two parts of the same entity. The aim of policies towards Eastern 
Europe is to ‘overcome the division’ and to fulfil ‘the aspiration of the peoples of 
central and eastern Europe to ‘rejoin Europe’30. In a series of speeches to appli-
cant states in central and eastern Europe – Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Czech Republic – van den Broek makes this same point: ‘You are a pro-
foundly European nation…’31. In the Commission profile of Poland as a candidate 
                                                                                                                                     
 
29 European Council, 1993 
30 Andriessen, 1991 
31 van den Broek 1997a, b, c, d, e 
 13 
for membership, it is argued that ‘for centuries Polish culture has been an integral 
part of European culture’32. This is a constant factor not only in policy documents 
and speeches on enlargement after 1989 but also in western policies towards East-
ern Europe during the cold war. The argument is that Eastern Europe is a part of 
‘us’ that now must be returned: 
  
We in Western Europe must not disappoint the great hopes which the peoples of 
Eastern Europe have of receiving our aid in their current emancipation process. Our 
credibility depends on how consistently we set our course towards integration to 
achieve a new European identity.33 
 
Reference to this sense of a shared destiny and a duty to enlarge is a regular fea-
ture in the arguments by the proponents for enlargement to central and Eastern 
Europe. According to Commission President Santer, ‘the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain ended the Cold War and presented us with a unique opportunity to unite 
Europe… We have a historical and moral duty to seize this opportunity’34. 
According to former French Prime Minister Alain Juppé, the wests Europeans 
have ‘a duty to solidarity’ with the central and east Europeans35.  
The founding myth of European integration starts already with the European 
situation after World War II. When the European Economic Community was 
founded in 1958, the founding states declared themselves “determined to lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,” called “upon 
the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts,” and ac-
corded “any European state” the right to apply for membership36. This pan-Euro-
pean vocation was upheld all through the Cold War, which was a cheap opportu-
nity for the EC and its Member States to reaffirm their devotion to the community 
ideology. At the same time, however, this reaffirmation created a public verbal 
commitment. At the end of Cold War and of communist rule in Central Eastern 
Europe the heads of state and government of the EC declared at their Strasbourg 
Summit of December 1989: 
 
The current changes and the prospects for development in Europe demonstrate the 
attraction which the political and economic model of Community Europe holds for 
many countries. The Community must live up to this expectation and these demands: 
its path lies not in withdrawal but in openness and cooperation, particularly with 
other European states… The objective remains… that of overcoming the divisions of 
Europe.37 
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3.2 Rhetorical argumentation 
The Community’s pan-European ideology ceased to be a low-cost legitimacy-en-
hancing device because the new CEE governments demanded massive support for 
their transition to liberal democracy, and a realization of the promise of member-
ship. The CEE governments based their claims to membership on the standard of 
legitimacy of the European Community: European identity and unity, liberal de-
mocracy, and multilateralism. They took the pan-European liberal commitment at 
face value and tried to demonstrate that these values and norms obliged the EU to 
admit them and that failing to do so would be an act of disloyalty to the ideational 
foundations of Community. They exposed inconsistencies between the constitu-
tive values and the past rhetoric and practice of the EC, on the one hand, and its 
current behaviour toward the CEECs, on the other.  
Some typical examples for these rhetorical strategies follow. The 
Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky justified his country’s official re-
quest for EU membership as the “return to this Community to which it has always 
belonged.”38 The Romanian ambassador to the EU, Constantin Ene, also stressed 
that “Romania has always been part of West European traditions”39. The Polish 
chief negotiator in the association negotiations with the EC, Olechowski, stated 
“that ‘the technocratic approach’ is not enough in these negotiations, which have a 
historical goal: give Europe back to Poland, and Poland back to Europe.”40 
The crucial element in the shaming strategy of the CEECs has been 
the argument that the EU failed to honour past commitments and to treat outside 
countries consistently. CEE state actors and drivers within the community have 
repeatedly pointed to the mismatch between political declarations such as the 
Strasbourg declarations and actual behaviour, such as protectionism and delaying 
tactics concerning enlargement. Moreover, CEE governments demanded equal 
treatment as former applicant countries had enjoyed in earlier rounds of enlarge-
ment. According to Peter van Ham, the Spanish and Portuguese models have been 
major trump cards which could be played by the Central Europeans. Already in 
1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kodolanyi argued that the Iberian enlargement 
“had been the result of a political settlement” (pushing economic problems into 
the background) and “that the Community would do the right thing now to take a 
similar decision”.41 
 Members of both the Commission and the EP (institutions that are 
“drivers” for eastern enlargement) invoked the standard of legitimacy against the 
egoistic preferences of some Member States. First, they emphasized collective 
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identity and, second, on various occasions, Commission President Jacques Delors 
publicly exposed the inconsistency between the Community’s rhetoric and its 
practical behaviour toward the CEECs. “It’s no good making fine speeches with a 
sob in your voice on Sunday and then on Monday opposing the trade concessions 
enabling those countries to sell their goods and improve their standards of liv-
ing”.42 Furthermore, the “drivers” for eastern enlargement have repeatedly ad-
dressed the credibility issue directly in order to put pressure on the “breake-
men”.43 Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan stressed that the blockage of association 
negotiations by some Member States “could affect the Community’s 
credibility.”44  
These rhetorical strategies and arguments were echoed by the “driv-
ers” among the Member States. In his 1990 Bruges speech, German President 
Richard von Weizsäcker first recalled the founding myth of European integration 
and then called upon the Member States’ governments to follow their example 
under the present conditions. However, the German government sought to deem-
phasize its self-interest in enlargement and claimed that “we don’t concern our-
selves with these countries out of national interest. We feel we should take the 
opportunity to create a complete Europe.”45 British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher proposed in her 1990 Aspen speech that the Community should accept 
the CEECs as members and based this claim on both identity and consistency: 
“We can’t say in one breath that they are part of Europe, and in the next our Euro-
pean Community Club is so exclusive that we won’t admit them.”46 
3.3 Rhetorical entrapment 
Evidence suggests that the rhetorical action of the supporters for eastern enlarge-
ment did not genuinely change the preferences of the opponents but effectively 
prevented them from openly opposing the enlargement process. In other words, 
the opponents became rhetorically entrapped. It was difficult for them to attack 
the pro-enlargement arguments on legitimate grounds. On various occasions, the 
“drivers” confronted the “breakmen” with the choice of either publicly give in to 
or openly opposing a step toward Eastern enlargement. These steps along the way 
were usually small or involved no immediate costs or obligations, making them 
more difficult to reject. However, with each small public commitment, the credi-
bility costs of non-enlargement rose.47  
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The rhetorical entrapment of the Community was furthered by some 
of its formal institutional features. One was the Commission’s proposal power. In 
developing the major documents defining the EU’s policy toward Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Commission was able to outline the intergovernmental de-
bate, to put the Member States under pressure to make decisions, and to accelerate 
the process. In so doing the Commission could confront the reluctant Member 
States with a rationale for enlargement based on constitutive community rules 
which brutally limited their range of legitimate objections.  
Another important institutional feature was the rotating European 
Council presidency which gives the country holding the presidency some agenda 
power in the choice of, and the emphasis on, policy issues. In this perspective, it is 
small wonder that the most important initial steps toward enlargement were taken 
at the Copenhagen Council of 1993, the Essen Council of 1994 and the Gothen-
burg Council of 2001 when the presidency was held by Denmark, Germany and 
Sweden respectively, all declared supporters of a firm commitment to Eastern 
enlargement.48  
Once the decision to enlarge was made, each further step toward 
preparing for the opening of accession negotiations was presented as a logical 
follow-up to this decision and tricky to oppose. This paved the way for a situation 
where the “brakemen” could only turn to the accompanying negotiations on treaty 
and policy reform in order to protect their interests and retrieve some of their ex-
pected losses. Alan Mayhew’s observation at various European Council summits 
that “while there was little discussion or dispute on the common objective of ac-
cession, the minor trade concessions proved very difficult to negotiate” reflects 
this striking character of the enlargement decision-making process. I will further 
evaluate this situation in the following chapter.49  
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4 Unequal members despite 
rhetorical commitment 
The analysis above shows us that rhetorical action forced the EU15 to embrace 
the CEECs into the European Union, although this was not the rational thing to 
do. I will now argue that this is not the whole story. The EU15 did not fully em-
brace the newcomers as equal members. Instead, they managed to induce several 
restrictions towards the new members in order to constrain them and their possi-
bilities to enjoy the full advantages of their membership. The EU15 used the op-
portunity that the Treaty of Nice and the new Constitution offered to protect their 
self-interests in an enlarged Community. They also continuously use their power 
at the domestic level to constrain the basic four freedoms in order to protect their 
interests, and as a consequence, the newcomers can not enjoy the same benefits 
from their membership as the “old” Member States do. 
In the following, I will evaluate these restrictions and, using ration-
alist institutionalism as an analysing tool, demonstrate that the Member States’ 
struggle for protecting their interests still constrain the newcomers’ advantages of 
their membership. Moreover, I will demonstrate that these restrictions run counter 
to the Union’s possibilities to work effectively in its new enlarged form.  
4.1 The need for “emergency brakes” 
When analyzing to what extent the Eastern enlargement is compatible with the 
personal-interest view of the EU15, it is essential to on the one hand identify the 
main strategic difficulties of the enlargement process and on the other hand to 
identify the main decisive players of EU15 countries and the main personal disad-
vantages they fear from enlargement.  
4.1.1 Strategic difficulties of the enlargement process 
The candidate countries are inferior to the countries already members of the 
Community. There is an obvious divergence between the pre-entry and the post-
entry power of a new member country. A candidate has no impact on the acquis 
communautaire in the pre-entry stage of the process. The country has a single 
choice: to join the community with the current constitution defined by EU15, the 
‘old’ Member States, or to stay outside the Community. But when a country once 
has become member in the Community, in the post-entry stage, the same country 
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takes part in the decision-making process both in regard to day-to-day policy and 
to constitutional decisions with the same rights as the old member countries50.  
This means that the post-entry influence can be used for the “na-
tional” benefit, especially when it comes to redirecting EU budgetary spending 
towards objectives benefiting the new members, and history shows us that is also 
has. When the UK became member of the Community in 1973, the country was 
successful in promoting structural spending for national benefits, and when Portu-
gal and Spain became members they were successful in redefining spending pri-
orities of the Common Agricultural Policies for their benefit51.  
Thus, there is a risk that the candidates in the post-entry would not 
adhere to respect what has already been achieved in the Community by the old 
Member States. In order for the old Member States to gain from an enlargement, it 
is important that the new Member States respect the established interests of the 
old members52. As Brücker, Schröder and Weise put it; the candidate countries are 
gatecrashers in the sense that they would prefer to enter the club without paying 
the full admission fee or without complying with all the rules which are obligatory 
for the members of the club, and the EU15 are doorkeepers in the sense that they 
intend to admit only those members who honestly adopt all rules of the club53.  
In order to make sure that the candidates would ‘fit in the club’, the 
incumbent EU members clarified the conditions successful applicants would have 
to fulfil. In more general terms, this was done by the heads of state and govern-
ment at the European Council of Copenhagen in June 1993. Applicants would, 
according to the “Copenhagen criteria” need to accept the basic aims of a political 
and a monetary union. They would need to have a stable and democratic political 
system, a functioning market economy capable of withstanding competition pres-
sure in the internal market and the willingness and ability to implement the acquis 
communautaire (the EU laws and regulations)54. However, the problem remained 
that there is no credible commitment for future respect of the acquis communau-
taire, because after obtaining membership, the candidate has an incentive not to 
follow through with his announcement55. Therefore, the strategic challenge for the 
Union was to create commitment devices that guarantee the EU15 that enlarge-
ment is beneficial for them.  
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4.2  The decisive players and their interests 
4.2.1 The Council of Ministers 
Opinion polls show that enlargement is not very popular among citizens of the 
EU1556. The main reason for the western public for being negative to eastern 
enlargement is that the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) are said 
to gain more, in economic and welfare terms, from a fully liberalized trade than 
the western countries would57. There are also strong lobby groups that bear a large 
share of enlargement’s costs, such as farmers, trade unions and beneficiaries of 
regional spending. EU farmers of the West fear that their subsidies from the CAP 
will reduce as a consequence of the accession of countries with large and low-
productive agricultural sectors58. Recipients of structural spending in the West 
fear redefined spending priorities in favour of the new Member States. Trade un-
ions fear the effects of trade liberalisation and labour mobility on real wages and 
losses of jobs. Theory suggests that unrestricted international migration leads to 
poor countries having the highest emigration rates and rich countries having the 
highest immigration rates59.  
Since national governments represented in the Council all act under 
a re-election constraint this is obviously crucial in respect to their choice to sup-
port enlargement or not. According to rational choice theory, individuals repre-
senting the governments can not be expected to support enlargement if this would 
seriously undermine their chances of being re-elected in national elections. How-
ever, after being rhetorically entrapped and therefore forced to give in to the de-
mands on enlargement, the reasonable thing for the EU15 Council to do is to try 
to constrain the negative effects of the enlargement.  
4.2.2 The European Parliament 
The members of the Parliament also act under the constraints of re-election. In 
addition, the Treaty of Amsterdam limits the size of the Parliament at 700 seats 
(presently 626)60. Thus, since the eastern enlargement requires seats for more than 
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74 MPs from new Member States, this reduces EU15 seats and so reduces the 
chances of sitting MPs to retain their seats. This means that personal interests of 
the EU15’s MPs are at stake. Allocating more seats increases re-election prob-
abilities and the power of EU15 MPs in likely future West-East spending disputes. 
Transitory provisions are sufficient to protect EU15 MPs, since a reduction of 
seats per country only will affect a MP personally if this reduction takes place 
within the expected active political life of that individual. The earliest possible 
year for the reduction of seats in the Parliament is after the European election in 
2004, which means that delaying the adjustment until 2009, when a majority of 
the current MPs would be too old for re-election, would protect a majority of the 
MPs of the pre-enlargement Parliament61.   
The Treaty of Nice and the Constitution were negotiated by the 
European Council and not by the Parliament, but there are reasons to expect the 
Parliament’s preferences to have an effect anyway. More seats for the EU15 MPs 
means better opportunities for the Council to limit the power of new candidates.62  
4.3 The outcome of the Nice negotiations 
The official objective of the Treaty of Nice was to change the institutions and 
decision making mechanisms of the European Union to safeguard their function 
and effectiveness in an enlarged Union63. Given this objective, the outcome of the 
Nice European Council could be regarded as a failure. Many objectives identified 
as essential for an EU comprising 27 countries were not realized. An example of 
such failures concerns the condescension to extend qualified majority voting to 
policy fields of political substance. The extension of the Parliament seats above 
the 700 ceiling of the Amsterdam Treaty is another failure. These failures are, 
together with others, crucial to the effectiveness of the Union. The central thing 
here is to show the consistency between the Treaty of Nice and the personal inter-
ests of decisive players, and that this consistency also is counterproductive in 
terms of the official objective of the Treaty. 
4.3.1 Council voting 
The results in the Treaty regarding the voting weights and procedures in the 
Council were as follows: voting weights in EU-27 range from 29 for the big four 
countries to 3 for Malta. The sum of votes is 345 and 91 votes form a blocking 
minority. This means that 255 votes are necessary to reach a qualified majority, 
and these should be cast by at least a majority of member countries. In addition to 
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this, population weighting has also been introduced. The qualified majority needs 
to represent at least 62 per cent of the total population of the Union, if a Council 
member so requests64.  
In the pre-Nice constitution a qualified majority is reached at 71 per 
cent (95 votes out of 134), and there are no additional requirements for QMV in 
regard to the number of countries or of population shares65. A simple maintenance 
of the pre-Nice system would have given EU15 countries 64.9 per cent of Council 
votes66. In the post-Nice constitution, however, EU15 countries command 68.7 
per cent of Council votes67, which means that the post-Nice situation is clearly 
more beneficial for the EU15 as a whole. The gains in power for the large EU15 
countries more than compensate for the losses for small EU15 countries, who 
have most probably accepted their loss of power to other western MSs in the be-
lief that they have more common interests with these countries than with the 
CEECs.  
Regarding the capability of the Council to act after the enlargement, 
Coleman’s decision probability, which is defined as the number of winning coali-
tions in relation to the total number of possible coalitions, is useful. The fact that 
the results of Nice are clearly worse with regard to capability to act than what the 
results would have been with a simple maintenance of the pre-Nice system 
strengthens the assumption that the Nice Treaty was a failure as it did not improve 
the effectiveness and functioning of the Union. Coleman’s decision probability is 
at 2.9 per cent in a scenario where the pre-Nice system has been maintained in the 
EU27 Council, while it is at 2 per cent in the Nice constitution68. Thus, these re-
sults contradict the official objective of the Treaty of Nice.  
 The outcome of the Nice treaty also shows us a reluctance to move 
from unanimity to majority voting in such fields as taxation, social policy, immi-
gration or structural spending. In order to make the decision making more effec-
tive and to further the Union’s capability to act it would have been very helpful to 
extend areas of QMV, but the EU15 chose to protect their own interests in making 
sure that the candidates would not be able to force them to changes that are dam-
aging to their own interests 69.  
4.3.2 Parliament seats 
The Nice results regarding the Parliament can also be compared with a fictitious 
pre-Nice situation based on an extrapolation of the former EU15 constitution. The 
pre-Nice seat allocation of EU-27 comprise a 700 seats limit, as stated in the 
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Amsterdam Treaty and obtained through a proportionate seat reduction 70. The 
post-Nice seat allocation looked slightly different, and the reforms were to the 
advantage of EU15 countries in the enlarged Union in comparison to the 
extrapolated status quo. The outcome of the Nice negotiations showed a share of 
EU15 seats that was slightly extended, from 71.6 per cent to 73.1 per cent, and 
this is not to be explained through desire to make the representation more 
proportionate to population. On the contrary, while population ranking is Czech 
Republic (10.3 million inhabitants) – Belgium (10.2 mill.) – Hungary (10.1 mill.) 
and Portugal (9.9 mill.), seat allocation is 20 – 22 – 20 – 2271. This ranking 
indicates that restricting the power of the newcomers was important during the 
Nice negotiations.  
During the pre-negotiations of the Nice Treaty, it was widely re-
garded that increasing the number of seats above the Amsterdam ceiling of 700 
would negatively effect the efficiency of parliamentary work 72. Nevertheless, the 
outcome of the Nice negotiations showed an increased number of seats above the 
Amsterdam ceiling to 732, which further indicates the relevance of political-eco-
nomic driving forces. In a fictionate extrapolated pre-Nice constitution with the 
700 ceiling, the EU15 would have had 71.6 per cent of the seats (see above) or 
503 seats out of 70073. In the post-Nice constitution, with 535 EU15 seats out of 
totally 732 (or 73.1 per cent), is more beneficial for the “old” Member States74.  
The risk of personal losses for the current MPs are also eliminated in 
the Treaty of Nice, more specifically through the “Protocol on the Enlargement of 
the European Union”, which is included into the Treaty75. The new seat allocation 
takes effect on 1 January 2004. However, the Treaty states that if all 12 accession 
treaties are not signed at this date (which they are not), a transitory provision will 
come into force. Since all the 12 countries’ accession treaties had not been signed 
by the beginning of 2004 (which was almost certain at the time of the Nice nego-
tiations), this means that the 535 seat restriction for the EU15 will not be fully 
applied before 2009. Due to the age of a majority of the present MPs, this transi-
tory provision makes sure that they will not suffer from personal adverse conse-
quences of enlargement76. This is not consistent with the official objectives of the 
Nice negotiations. On the contrary, to augment the Parliament’s seats above the 
Amsterdam ceiling and to allow a transitory period is counterproductive for the 
capability to act effectively.  
Having analyzed the outcome of the Nice Intergovernmental nego-
tiations the only proper conclusion in my mind is that it cannot be understood by 
merely looking at the official objectives. It seems clear to me that the EU15 used 
the opportunity that the Nice negotiations offered to safeguard their own interests 
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in an eastern enlargement, and they did this through appropriate constitutional 
adjustments. The new Council voting and the augmentation of seats in the Parlia-
ment have actually decreased the capability to act, and thus run counter to the 
official objectives. 
4.4 The EU Constitution 
The Constitutional Treaty (Constitution) drafted by the Convention on the Future 
of Europe in June-July 2003, amended by the Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) between October 2003 and June 2004 and finally adopted by the European 
Council on 18 June 2004 can easily be criticised as having “failed to match the 
internal and external challenges faced by the Union”, meaning that it has only 
‘codified’ those laws and rules already in existence for a long time.77 Most of this 
constitution is not new.78 The actual contribution constitution-building may bring 
about to European integration is consequently reduced to the creation of a symbol 
and some institutional adaptations in preparing for the upcoming round of EU 
enlargement (regarding the membership of Bulgaria and Rumania).79  
The origins of the IGC lie in the unfinished business of the treaty of 
Nice that settled the simple mechanics of enlargement, but did not focus on how a 
Union of 25 or more states could then function effectively.80 So, at the Laeken 
summit two years ago, EU Heads of State and Government agreed to establish a 
Convention on the Future of Europe with a view both to improved institutions and 
a single constitutional treaty.81  
I will in the following focus on institutional changes, in particular 
the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, to see how much of the regulations 
laid down in the Treaty of Nice that has been changed in the draft Constitution 
and how much of the regulations that have remained unaffected.  
4.4.1 Changes of the Council voting system 
The reform of the Council was at the centre of the debates of the Convention and 
the IGC. The Constitutional Treaty introduces significant changes affecting this 
institution.  
The voting system: In its draft, the Convention proposed a com-
pletely new system of qualified majority voting known as “double majority”: the 
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majority of Member States and the majority of the population of the Union. 82 The 
new system introduced by the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-25) can be consid-
ered a real revolution in Council decision-making83. With the new rules laid down 
in the Constitution, the system has been made much simpler and more effective. 
The weighing of votes, once subject to long and difficult negotiations between 
Member States in Nice, will be repealed. Instead of the three criteria required until 
now for a qualified majority (threshold of weighted votes, majority of Member 
States and 62 per cent of the population of the Union)84, only two criteria will 
apply: a majority of the Member States and of the population of the Union. This 
means that the equality of Member States is respected as each one has one vote, 
whilst their different population sizes are also taken into account.85  
A qualified majority is now achieved only if a decision is supported 
by 55 per cent of Member States, including at least fifteen of them, representing at 
the same time at least 65 per cent of the Union’s population. Council decision-
making is facilitated as a greater number of combinations of Member States can 
constitute a qualified majority than under the system created by the Treaty of 
Nice. In an enlarged Union, this is essential for the Union’s smooth operation and 
ability to act. Moreover, this new system will avoid, during subsequent enlarge-
ments, long negotiations on the allocation of votes to Member States and the defi-
nition of the qualified majority threshold.  
Since the CEECs are many but often small countries it is easier for 
them to (together with a few West European countries) form a qualified majority, 
than if the threshold of weighted votes would still have been one of the criteria for 
a qualified majority. This might be a result of the more powerful position that 
membership gave the CEECs during the negotiations forming the new Constitu-
tion, compared to the relative weak negotiation positions they had as ‘outsiders’ 
when the Nice Treaty was negotiated. It might also be a result of the heavy pres-
sure put on the MSs to create a somewhat more efficient system in an enlarged 
Union. Since the official objective of the Constitution is to clear up the unfinished 
business of the Treaty of Nice (regarding the efficiency of the Union) it is difficult 
for the MS to once again fail to adhere to their official promises. They are rhetori-
cally trapped. However, it is still easier for the EU15 to form a qualified majority 
because of their number (15) and total population (78 per cent), and this situation 
will be evident even in a Union containing 27 Member States.86  
Moreover, the Constitution established the date for this new system 
to take effect on the 1 November 2009, the date when the new Commission will 
be inaugurated following the 2009 European elections. Between 2004 and 2009, 
the current system provided for in the Nice Treaty will be applied. The Constitu-
tional Treaty includes these provisions in the “Protocol on the transitional provi-
sions relating to the institutions and bodies of the Union” annexed to the Consti-
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tution. This delay for the new system to come into force means that the effects of 
it will not be evident in another five years or more. To post-pone these important 
changes that clearly need to be done as soon as possible is clearly due to short-
sighted political self-interests.  
Extension of qualified majority voting: The extension of qualified 
majority voting is a central part of the institutional reform of the European Union 
associated with enlargement. Provided for in the founding treaties and extended to 
include new provisions at each reform of the treaties, extending qualified majority 
voting is vitally important in an enlarged Union where unanimity will become 
ever more difficult to attain.  
The QMV within the Council is extended to twenty-seven areas in 
the Constitution (Article I-24).87 Especially worth mentioning is the move to 
qualified majority voting in the fields of structural spending and immigration (Art 
III-223 and Art III-267).88 Both these articles were maintained under unanimity 
voting in the Nice Treaty.89 However, a certain reluctance to switch to QMV is 
still apparent. Art III-223 concerning Structural Funds will switch to QMV from 1 
Jan 2007. This means that the next programming period, from 2007 to 2013, will 
again be adopted by unanimity. In other words, the national ministers of today 
will most probably not be personally punished and exposed to the rage of the 
western regions that will lose their structural aid to the eastern newcomers. By the 
year of 2013, most of the politicians working today at the top-level will have other 
mandates and will not be under constraints of re-election anymore, and to post-
pone the switch to QMV in this field is due to national short-sighted political in-
terests. Art III-267 concerning immigration will be switched to QMV with one 
exception: Member States will keep their right of veto for setting the number of 
third country nationals entering their territory to search for employment. This last 
clause efficiently diminishes the risk for the national governments of being criti-
cized by the trade unions if they fear a loss of jobs to the immigrants.  
Moreover, in three specific cases, the Constitutional Treaty provides 
for a qualified majority, but includes an “emergency brake” clause: the field of 
free movement of workers and two fields associated with the area of freedom, 
security and justice.90 This clause provides a Member State which considers that 
the fundamental principles of its social security or legal system are under threat 
with the possibility of appealing to the European Council, in which case the leg-
islative procedure is suspended. To let go of their veto power in the field of free 
movement of workers and allow a truly free market in regards to workers would 
put the Western governments in great difficulties at the national level, as further 
analysed below.  
Certain Articles will remain subject to unanimity in whole or in part, 
as they are particularly important for the Union and its Member States. The fields 
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of taxation and harmonisation in the field of social security and social protection 
will thus remain subject to unanimity.91 In order to make the decision making 
more effective and to further the Union’s capability to act it would have been very 
helpful to extend areas of QMV, but the EU15 chose to protect their own interests 
in making sure that the candidates would not be able to force them to changes that 
are damaging to their own interests.92  
4.4.2 A further increase of Parliament seats 
The reforms introduced by the Constitution concerning the European Parliament 
largely focuses on the creation of a new system of distributing seats between the 
Member States.93 Most striking in my view is the fact that the Constitutional 
Treaty lays down the maximum number of seats to 750, thus increasing the cur-
rent number laid down in the Treaty of Nice (732 seats).94 The Amsterdam ceiling 
is thus broken for the second time, although serious criticism has pointed out the 
importance of diminishing the huge and hardly workable body of the European 
Parliament. This means that the national interests of the MS obviously are more 
important than the need to make sure that the Parliament will be able to function 
efficiently in a Union containing 27 Member States. The minimum number of 
seats per Member States is to be six, in order to make sure that, even in the least 
populous Member States, all the major shades of political opinion will have a 
chance of being represented in the European Parliament.  
For the 2004-2009 legislatures, the distribution of seats established 
in line with the rules approved at Nice and set down in the Treaty of Accession 
concluded with the ten new Member States has been kept in the Protocol on the 
transitional provisions relating to the institutions and bodies of the Union. This 
means that there are no major progresses concerning the efficiency of the Parlia-
ment in the new Constitution compared to the provisions laid down in the Nice 
Treaty. Moreover, the allocation rule which states that representation of citizens is 
degressively proportional will be in force not earlier than 2009, which means that 
the MPs of today (considering their high average age) will suffer no personal 
losses in the next European Parliament election since most of them will be retired 
by that time anyway.95  
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4.5 The Commission’s Services Directive 
On the 2 February this year, the European Commission announced that, working 
with the European Parliament, it would revise the proposal on the EU Services 
Directive to address fears that have been expressed since it was adopted in Janu-
ary 2004. The Commission published its draft directive over a year ago, and it was 
rapidly seen as a frontal attack on social rights truly won by the unions in some of 
the western Member States who feared it would give a green light for widespread 
privatisation. The publication of the services directive has attracted an unusual 
amount of controversy because of its potential to affect Member States’ control of 
health and social services, responsibilities that are currently largely outside EU 
competence.96 At the heart of the draft directive is a set of prohibitions or limita-
tions on governmental rules and regulations that the Commission argue Member 
States frequently use to hinder the right of private firms to establish where they 
choose (one of the fundamental economic freedoms on which the Union is based). 
The prohibitions apply to all services that are deemed to be economic activities 
rather than purely public services.97 As a consequence of the protests uttered by 
the trade unions, some of the Western European States have demanded a revision 
of the Commission’s draft directive.  
These Member States reluctance to accept the draft directive (al-
though it has already been adopted by them) when exposed of the pressure from 
the domestic trade unions is an illustrative example of short-sighted political self-
interest and an unwillingness to accept the newcomers as equal members with 
equal rights to enjoy the four freedoms upon with the Union is based. This egoism 
of some of the old Member States also works against the Union’s ability to work 
effectively. In the following, I will further evaluate the Services directive and the 
obstacles faced by the Union.  
4.5.1 Domestic pressure and political self-interest 
Services represent an ever growing proportion of Europe’s gross domestic prod-
uct, currently accounting for around three-quarters of economic activity in the EU. 
However, the growth has been slower than it might otherwise have been because 
of the numerous barriers and obstacles preventing service employers and workers 
from offering their skills in countries other than their own. The European Com-
mission has argued that “economic growth and job creation afforded by the ser-
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vice sector” has been hampered by overly burdensome regulation, the Commis-
sion’s only rationale for which can be trade protectionism, it conjectures.98 An 
independent study for the Commission has concluded that the liberalisation of 
services could create up to 600,000 new jobs and generate new economic activity 
worth euro33 a year. If Europe wants to become the most competitive area in the 
world, services need to move more freely, some argue.99  
Instead of trying to remove these barriers by a series of sectional in-
terventions, the European Commission proposed a general directive covering all 
services apart from transport, e-commerce and financial services. Its aim is to en-
dorse the free movement across borders of all other services, with some limited 
exceptions and laying down rules for the provision of information. When final-
ised, it will have to be transposed into national law.100 
One of the most serious criticisms levelled at the EU services direc-
tive – dubbed ‘the [Frits] Bolkestein directive’ after the internal market commis-
sioner under whose mandate it was penned – is that it will lead to ‘social dump-
ing’, or the gradual attrition of Europe’s widely recognized social model. Fingers 
point from all sides to ‘the country of origin principle’ – whereby a person pro-
viding a service in another member state only has to comply with his/her national 
law – as the main threat to Europe’s well-being. The ‘country of origin’ principle 
derives from the famous Cassis de Dijon ruling by the European Court of Justice, 
in 1979, that any product legally manufactured and marketed in one member state 
may be sold in another. It formed the basis of the EU’s 1992 programme, which 
effectively removed most national barriers to trade in goods.101  
Trade unionists claim that the application of the country of origin 
principle to services will see companies gathering to establish themselves in 
Member States with the lowest levels of social protection. At the same time, the 
workers that those companies export might have poorer health and safety stan-
dards, which will lead to a further decline in consumer protection and social wel-
fare. The fear that the directive would lead to an influx of cheap labour and a de-
cline in social standards as companies took advantage of workers from poorer 
Member States is significant, despite the Commission’s insistence that workers 
would have to comply with employment rules, including minimum wages, in the 
country where they work.102 In other words, ‘posted workers’ would have to obey 
local social and labour legislation, wherever they are working.103 
Opponents on the directive further claim that the country of origin 
principle, by fully opening up competition in the service sector, might lead to an 
overall drop in the quality of social services and healthcare, sectors that are both 
included in the directive’s scope. Social non-governmental organisations are wor-
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ried that authorities or companies in financial difficulties could be tempted to 
overlook national standards when presented with cheap offers for social service 
provisions from other Member States with lower standards of social care. Such a 
problem would be difficult to regulate at that level as there are no EU-wide social 
service standards. Under the primary legislation of the EU, the EC Treaty – the 
organisation and delivery of health services and medical care – is a responsibility 
of Member States, but there is no constitutional guarantee for the level of protec-
tion individual states have elected to pursue.104 This is the reason why the national 
governments began to panic that their healthcare spending would spiral out of 
control when they had to foot the bill for EU citizens crawling across their borders 
in order to seek routine medical treatment.  
The powerful trade unions have a great impact on their national gov-
ernments’ standpoints in EU negotiations since they are important domestic inter-
ests groups, and their reactions to different political questions impose a severe 
constraint on their national government’s freedom of manoeuvre. As argued 
above, since national governments represented in the Council all act under a re-
election constraint this is obviously crucial in respect to their preferences and ac-
tions. The services directive represents a further step towards a truly free internal 
market, and a removal of legal and administrative trade-barriers could lead to 
greater competitiveness, a pressure of the costs and also unemployment in the 
former protected western service sector. Politicians interested in re-election will 
most likely respond to the demands for protectionist legislation from such interest 
groups. The result is low incentives for the governments to accept the services 
directive and create an ever deepening union within the newly widened union.105  
For socialist governments, these fears, if they are realistic or not, 
obviously represents a great problem. The rational thing to do here for most of the 
EU15 in order to keep their power is obviously to put as much constraints as pos-
sibly on the free movement of labour and services from and to the newcomers. 
Regardless if the services directive would actually erode the standards and harm 
the social entitlements or not, some of the western European Member States have 
vetoed the Commissions draft of services directive. As a consequence, the CEECs 
will not have full admission to the desirable western markets in the years to come.  
In sum, the EU15 could not avoid the Eastern enlargement because 
of rhetorical action and entrapment. However, this is still not the end of the story. 
The directive analyzed above is an illustrative example of how the EU15 have let 
the CEECs into the Union, but still not truly embraced them. When the struggle 
for an exclusive western European “club” is inevitable lost it is time to reach for 
the opportunities that the veto-power offers. The failure of the services directive is 
probably just one of several indications of protectionism in the years to come. The 
Constitutional Treaty includes an “emergency brake” clause in the field of free 
movement of workers which in practice means that a Member State can veto a 
decision in this field if the MS considers that the fundamental principles of its 
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social security or legal system are under threat. This effectively guarantees the 
EU15 that their national self-interests are safe, even in future similar situations.  
 31 
5 Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to explain why the new Member States in the 
Union are still not able to enjoy the full benefits of their memberships, and why 
they are still constrained by decisions taken by the EU15. I have shown, using 
rational choice theory when analysing three different empirical cases, how the 
Member States needed guarantees that their self-interests would be safe guarded 
even after the enlargement, and how they grasped the opportunities offered to 
them in the Nice negotiations, the negotiations on the European Constitution and 
recently in the negotiations on the Commission’s proposed Services Directive.  
Frank Schimmelfennig’s rhetorical action theory has been used to 
explain the initial decision to enlarge the European Union. A pure rational 
explanation obviously does not succeed in clearing up why the Member States of 
the Union took the unanimous decision for enlargement; the EU15 do not gain 
considerably from admitting the CEECs as full members in the EU. A more 
reasonable solution for the EU15 would have been to establish bilateral 
agreements with their eastern neighbours, thus gaining from new promising 
trading markets but not allowing the CEEC access to the Union’s structural funds 
and labour markets. Rhetorical action theory is helpful to illustrate how candidates 
and their supporters used arguments based on collective identity, norms and 
values of the Western community to shame opponents into acquiescing to 
enlargement. Through a process of rhetorical action, the interest- and power-based 
initial outcome of the CEECs’ association to the EU was turned into the rule-
based outcome of membership.  
 The analysis above shows that, in a community environment, 
community members can be induced to behave in a rule-conforming way when 
they are confronted with arguments that call upon their prior commitments, accuse 
them of acting inconsistently, call into question their reputation and credibility 
and thereby shame them to take note of to their obligations as community mem-
bers. The pro-enlargement coalition – consisting of the CEECs, a group of those 
EU member governments that were most likely to benefit from enlargement and 
policy entrepreneurs in the Commission – strategically used arguments based on 
the identity, ideology, values, norms and past practice of the EU to shame the 
anti-enlargement coalition of Member States, which expected individual net losses 
from Eastern enlargement and was in a position of superior bargaining power, into 
accepting accession negotiations with CEEC aspirants. The point here has been 
that in order to trigger a decision to enlarge, something more than instrumental 
calculations and something less than a selfless concern for “the kidnapped east” 
has been at play.  
However, Schimmelfennig’s rhetorical action theory still can not 
explain the inequality among the current Member States of the Union. The new-
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comers are hindered to utilize the full benefits of their memberships. Using ra-
tional choice theory as an analysing tool I have shown that the EU15 have tried to 
constrain the power of the newcomers in the EU institutions in every possible 
way. Furthermore, the new Member States are hindered to make use of their rights 
to at least one of the four freedoms upon which the Union is based, the free 
movement of services between Member States. As a consequence, the necessary 
preparation for a Union consisting of up to 27 Member States has been hindered 
and delayed, and the ability of the Union’s institutions to work effectively has 
been undermined. I have used rhetorical action theory and rational choice theory 
as complementary theories to explain the enlargement and the current situation of 
unequal memberships and an inefficient Union. Hence, the analysis here fits with 
what existing research on enlargement has concluded, but takes the analysis a step 
further.  
The three cases that I have chosen to analyze in this essay; the Nice 
Treaty, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Commission’s 
draft Services Directive, are all illustrative examples of this phenomenon; 
The Treaty of Nice is successful in the sense that it has helped to 
solve a commitment problem; pre-entry promises of candidate countries to respect 
old members’ interests are not credible. Nice created credible guarantees from the 
perspectives of the EU15 members through institutional reforms that would re-
strict the newcomers’ post-entry power. But the Nice Treaty is not successful in 
regards to the official objectives; to change the institutions and decision making 
mechanisms of the European Union in order to safeguard their function and effec-
tiveness in an enlarged Union. These objectives have actually been widely ignored 
in favour of the personal interests of the ‘old’ Member States. Capability to act 
has not been improved; quite on the contrary, the new constitutional structures 
have decreased the effectiveness of the Union. In that sense, the Treaty of Nice is 
a failure.  
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe shows that the 
newcomers have gained a certain impact in the decision-making procedures as 
members of the EU. The Constitution is in many ways a step towards a more effi-
cient Union, thus fulfilling the official objectives of the Constitution to change the 
institutions and decision making mechanisms of the EU to safeguard their 
function and effectiveness in an enlarged Union106. These objectives were the 
official ones of the Nice Treaty as well, and the Constitution served the purpose to 
take care of the unfinished business of the Nice Treaty. However, the Constitution 
is a failure in regards to the European Parliament, which still is an enormous and 
painstakingly working body. The aim to reduce the Parliament seats below the 
Amsterdam ceiling of 700 seats was not succeeded. This means that there are no 
major progresses concerning the efficiency of the Parliament in the new 
Constitution compared to the provisions laid down in the Nice Treaty, and the 
national interests of the MS are obviously more important than the need to make 
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sure that the Parliament will be able to function efficiently in a Union containing 
27 Member States. 
Moreover, the Constitution established the date for the new voting 
system in the Council to take effect on the 1 November 2009, and between 2004 
and 2009 the current system provided for in the Nice Treaty will be applied. To 
post-pone these important changes that clearly need to be done as soon as possible 
is an obvious example of short-sighted political self-interests. Furthermore, even 
though the QMV within the Council is extended to twenty-seven areas in the Con-
stitution certain reluctance to switch to QMV is still apparent. In order to make 
the decision making more effective and to further the Union’s capability to act it 
would have been very helpful to extend areas of QMV even more, but the EU15 
chose to protect their own interests in making sure that the candidates would not 
be able to force them to changes that are damaging to their own interests. 
The failure to adopt the Commission’s Services Directive finally 
shows us that some of the western Member States are far from accepting the new-
comers as fully equal members in the Community, or to let them into and gain 
from the Western European market. The dream of a truly open market with free 
movement of labour and services is still far from coming true, even though it 
provides the base upon which the Union is grounded. When the struggle for an 
exclusive western European “club” is inevitable lost it is time to reach for the 
opportunities that the veto-power offers. The failure of the services directive is 
probably just one of several expressions of protectionism in the years to come. 
The Nice Treaty, the Constitution and the resistance of approving legislations that 
would affect the national interests in a way not wished for are examples of pure 
short-sighted political self-interest of the EU15. As a consequence the EU is 
currently a Union with unequal memberships, forming two different “leagues” of 
Member States with uneven odds and different degree of strength. Moreover, the 
decision-making procedures in the Union’s institutions are far more unwieldy and 
inefficient than needed to be. 
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